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CHAPTER VII 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF MILITANT 
DEMOCRACY 
PAUL CLITEUR & BASTIAAN RIJPKEMA' 
I. INTRODUCTION: DEMOCRACY IN TURBULENT TIMES 
In the year 2011 we have seen some radical changes in the 
Middle 'East: in successively Tunisia, Egypt and Libya the rul-
ing autocrats had to clear the field, and in other Arab countries 
the future of autocratic leaders has become much less certain. 
The initial euphoria has now given way to a more sober assess-
ment of the situation. Especially in Egypt and Tunisia Islamist 
parties proved to be very successful in the recent elections.' 
Apparently the crumbling down of autocracies does not neces-
sarily lead to the creation of liberal-democratic and secular 
states. The question is: to what extent is democracy likely to 
flourish in these states? Will these fragile democratic states be 
able to shed their autocratic past or will they relapse into au-
thoritarianism? And what does that tell us about the concept of 
'democracy'? Is democracy simply majority rule? And what is 
to be done when regimes are inaugurated by democratic means, 
and their intentions seem far from democratic? 
1 P.B. Cliteur, PhD is full time professor of Jurisprudence at Leiden Univer-
sity and author of The Secular Outlook, Wiley-Blackwell, Chicester 2010. 
Bastiaan Rijpkema, LL.M. is a PhD-candidate at the Department of Jurispru-
dence, Leiden University. 
2 See: Barrada, Hamid, 'Les 'barbus' au pied du mur', in: La Revue, 'Les 
Islamistes i't l'epreuve du pouvoir', No. 18, Decembre 2011, p. 50-52. 
A. Ellian, G. Molier (eds.), The State of Exception and Militant Democracy in a Time of 
Terror, 227-272. 
~ 2012 Republic of Letters Publishing. All rights reserved. 
PAUL CLITEUR AND BASTIAAN RIJPKEMA 
Few historical events are absolutely unique in the sense that 
they occur only once. History presents us with a plethora of 
examples from which we can learn, and more imp01iantly, 
should learn, because, as Santayana teaches us: 'Those who 
cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it' 3 
This contribution is dedicated to the question how democracy 
can protect itself against its own decay. There are historical 
parallels that may prove to be instructive and there are promi-
nent authors who struggled to come to grips with these phe-
nomena. This is where the concept of 'militant democracy' 
comes to the fore. 
The roots of the concept of 'militant democracy' can be traced 
back to the German emigre scholar Karl Loewenstein (1891-
1973). When he published his now Wyll-known article on the 
concept of militant democracy (in 1937)4 he had just settled 
down in the United States. After teaching at Yale University he 
accepted a lectureship at Amherst College and was about to 
become an American citizen in 1939.5 Loewenstein left for the 
U.S. when he realised that, in the new political climate that 
resulted from the Nazi ascendancy to power in 1933, his Jewish 
ancestry and liberal mind-set would not- to say the least- be in 
his favour. 6 It is evidently this specific context in which 
3 See: Santuynna. Cleurge, Reason in Common Sense, Vnlumt~ One of "The 
Lire of Reason', New York: Dovt:r Publications 1980 ( 1905), p, 284. 
4 The article was published in two parts, see; Loewenstein, Karl, 'Militant 
Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I', The American Political Science 
Review 1937, vol. 31 no. 3, p. 417-432 (hereafter: Loewenstein !937a) and 
Loewenstein, Kar!, 'Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, ll', The 
American Political Science Review 1937, vol. 31 no. 4, p. 638-658 (hereafter: 
Loewenstein 1937b). Both parts are reprinted in: Saj6, Andras (ed.), Militant 
Democracy, Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 2004, p. 231-262. Cer-
tain parts of the discussion involving militant democracy can, in fact, be found 
much earlier. For example Plato's criticism of democracy may be interpreted 
as the 'paradox of democracy': the possibility that a majority may decide that 
a tyrant should rule. See on this: Popper, Karl, The Open Society and Its Ene-
mies, London: Routledge 1995, p. 602 (note 4 to chapter 7 of volume 1). 
5 See: Kostal, R.W., 'The Alchemy of Occupation: Karl Loewenstein and the 
Legal Reconstruction of Nazi Germany, 1945-1946', Law and History Review 
2011, vol. 29 no. I, p. 3 
6 Kostal puts it this way: 'When the Nazis came to power in 1933, Loewen-
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Loewenstein's 1930's writings have to be understood. In a 1935 
article he describes how all over Europe democracy is involved 
in an existential confrontation with its - more aggressive -
counterpart: autocracy.' To Loewenstein the prospects of this 
confrontation looked grim. His 193 7 article can be read as a 
proposed answer to the problems that he diagnosed earlier, in 
short: democracy -just as its counterpart- has to become mili-
tant; thus the term was coined, and the concept was born. 
However, at the same time- in between the two articles pub-
lished by Loewenstein - the Dutch constitutional theorist 
George van den Bergh (1890-1 966) addressed the very same 
problem in his inaugural lecture as professor of constitutional 
law at the University of Amsterdam. In this lecture - entitled: 
'The democratic State and the non-democratic parties''- Van 
den Bergh defended the thesis that a democratic state de iure 
constituto does not have to, and de iure constituendo should not 
be willing to, tolerate non-democratic parties.' Although Van 
den Bergh shared the same diagnosis of the situation, the theo-
retical foundation of his solution differs notably from Loewen-
stein's. 
In the extensive literature on the concept of 'militant democ-
racy' reference is often made to Loewenstein as the 'father of 
the concept' .10 However, attention is hardly ever paid to what 
stein's Jewish ancestry, liberal cast of mind, and fine English were three 
compelling reasons for him to leave Munich for a lectureship at Yale Univer-
sity.' See Kostal2011, p. 3. 
7 Also published in two parts: Loewenstein, Karl, 'Autocracy versus Democ-
racy in Contemporary Europe, T, The American Political Science Review 
1935, vol. 29 no. 4, p. 571-593 (hereafter: Loewenstein 1935a) and Loewen-
stein, Karl, 'Autocracy versus Democracy in Contemporary Europe, 11', The 
American Political Science Review 1935, vol. 29 no. 5, p. 755-784 (hereafter: 
Loewenstein 1935b ). 
8 Van den Bergh, George, De democratische Staat en de niet-democratische 
partijen (in English: The democratic State and the non-democratic parties), 
Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers 1936. 
9 'De iw~e constituto' and 'de iure constituendo' being the Latin phrases for 
respectively 'established law' and 'law as it should be'. 
1° For a comprehensive overview of the (international) literature on the con-
cept, see: Thiel, Markus, 'Introduction', in: The 'Militant Democracy' Princi-
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Loewenstein himselfhad to say about his brainchild." This con-
tribution therefore has a twofold purpose: it attempts to fill this 
gap, while at the same time it is trying to shed some light on a 
number of fundamental questions regarding the concept of 
'militant democracy'. We will start by discussing at length 
Loewenstein's outline of the concept (§2), after which the ques-
tions Loewenstein leaves open will be dealt with in the third 
section, where Van den Bergh's approach to the same problem 
is reviewed (§3). After a brief recapitulation (§4), three con-
cepts of militant democracy will be discerned and in doing so, 
some other theoretical problems concerning 'militant democ-
racy' will be discussed (§5). 
2. LOEWENSTEIN: MILITANT DEMOCRACY 
2.1 Loewenstein 's diagnosis: democracy on the defensive 
In 1935 Loewenstein published an article in two parts, in which 
he expresses his deep concerns about the future of democracy in 
Europe." Loewenstein expresses the fear that democracy will 
eventually fall prey to autocracy: they are immersed in an exis-
tential battle, and democracy seems to be the weaker side. The 
article nevertheless ends on a positive note by claiming that not 
all hope is yet lost. When democracy becomes 'militant', it can 
resist the autocratic threat. In the following, Loewenstein's 
analysis will be discussed. 
The nature of the autocratic threat 
Autocracies, according to Loewenstein, are characterized by the 
absence of the separation of powers and a lack of mutual con-
pie in Modern Democracies, Thiei, Markus (ed.), Farnham: Ashgate 2009, 11-
13. 
11 The somewhat inaccessible nature of some of his articles- due to the inter~ 
mingling of factual accounts, legal analysis and theoretical-philosophical 
observations- could very well account for this. 
12 The above-mentioned: Loewenstein, Karl, 'Autocracy versus Democracy in 
Contemporary Europe, I' and Loewenstein, Karl, 'Autocracy versus Democ-
racy in Contemporary Europe, Il'. 
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trol within the administration. Power is concentrated in the 
hands of a person or group of persons who - uncontrolled by a 
free public opinion - can exercise an absolute power over the 
executive, legislative, and often also the judicial branch.'' 'Au-
tocracy' in Loewenstein's use is therefore a broad category, 
which roughly corresponds to what we would call an absolutist 
system. Under autocracy Loewenstein brings for example both 
German and Italian fascism, but also Soviet communism. 
Loewenstein stresses that such autocratic regimes are not new. 
Autocracy is historically by far the dominant form of govern-
ment." Democracy as we know it has become a strong competi-
tor only since the second half of the nineteenth century .15 So the 
rise of autocracies is at best a relapse into an old European 
'habit'. When Loewenstein proceeds by categorizing the vari-
ous European states along the lines of the democracy-autocracy 
distinction, he can only conclude that Europe is forced in the 
defensive. Where once the universal acceptance of democracy 
seemed inevitable, an autocratic victory now seems almost as 
likely. 16 
Loewenstein devotes the rest of his extensive discussion to a 
prognosis of the survival of democracy. He does this in a very 
thorough fashion: he wants to get to the nature of the autocratic 
threat. In Europe this autocratic threat largely stems from the 
rise of fascism. Loewenstein sees fascism as a universal politi-
cal technique, which - when carefully applied - leads to the 
establishment of an autocratic regime, although the rate at 
which this process is run through can vary, depending on na-
tional circumstances. 17 
13 Loewenstein 1935a, p. 571-572. 
14 See on this: Tullock, Gordon, 'Autocracy', in: The Encyclopaedia of Public 
Choice, Rowley, Charles K. and Schneider, Friedrich (eds.), New York: Klu-
wer 2004, p. 356-358. 
15 Loewenstein I 935a, p. 572-573. 
16 Loewenstein 1935a, p. 574. As 'still democratic states' Loewenstein men-
tions: Great Britain, The Irish Free State, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Switzerland and Czechoslovakia. Prone 
to autocracy are Spain and Greece. Seep. 571. 
17 Loewenstein 1935a, p. 584. 
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Fascism as a political technique 
The universal fascist method consists of several distinct 
phases. Firstly, they often find their origin in, and are nourished 
by, economic crises. The deep global economic depression of 
the 1930s made calls for government intervention grow louder 
in both Europe and the United States. Economic self-
government via the market had to make way for regulation by 
the government. This regulation would include limited eco-
nomic planning in order to restore confidence in the economy 
but also more radical forms like the American New Deal. 18 Cru-
cial in all this is the need for a centralized organization to coor-
dinate the large-scale intervention by the government. The 
benefits of such a centralized organization are no longer ques-
tioned at this point - the government simply has to act - and 
thus the ideal springboard for fascists is created. It is therefore 
no coincidence that the Nazis looked with particular interest to 
President Roosevelt's New Deal. In a 1933 interview we can 
see propaganda minister Goebbels extensively praising Roose-
velt's approach. He compliments the president with his plans 
and stresses that tackling economic problems cannot be left to 
private initiative; it is the government who should address these 
problems. 19 
A logical consequence of all this, so Loewenstein continues, 
is the implementation of a 'centralized planning authority': the 
need for a strong government is felt. The practice of seeking 
compromises- one of the essential qualities of democracy -, is 
now turned into an obstacle, making forceful action impossible. 
Clamping down political parties and free public opinion seems 
a necessary condition for being able to carry out an effective 
economic planning: the 'political irrationality' should be de-
stroyed so that a rational planning towards recovery can be 
made.20 Loewenstein does not say it in so many words, but the 
presumed lack of decisiveness in democracies obviously makes 
18 Loewenstein 1935a, p. 577. 
19 The interview can been seen in a documentary by BBC: BBC Four, 'The 
Century of Self, One: Happiness Machines', 2002. 
20 Loewenstein 1935a, p. 578-579. 
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it easy to discredit it in times of crisis. Compromise is no longer 
perceived as democracy's power, but turns into its grave weak-
ness. However, this is not all. Loewenstein explicitly points to 
another weakness of democracy. Where democracy on the one 
hand suffers from its indecisiveness, it also gives hostile parties 
ample oppmtunity to openly preach its destruction on these 
grounds. The generous and lenient Weimar Republic offered 
'Hitlerism' -as Loewenstein calls it- the perfect opportunity to 
use democracy with the express purpose of abolishing it. The 
anti-parliamentary groups joined the legislative bodies with the 
unreserved intention of causing the parliamentary system to 
breakdown.21 In this way 'democracy sharpened the dagger by 
which it had been stabbed in the back. ' 22 
In the last stage of the fascist technique the opportunities of-
fered by democracy are used to make the final steps towards the 
coup d'etat.23 A nationwide organization is set up, with local 
chapters under a strict central management. Small political tur-
moil is stirred until national attention turns to the issue, after 
which the necessary propaganda is deployed to discredit the 
existing political system. A great program is announced which 
makes- often contradictory- promises to various groups. Mass 
events are organized to feed discontent and stir agitation. Uni-
forms and military insignia appear in the streets. The state has 
now become a seething mass of discontent and ready for rebel-
lion and civil war, when, from the depths of the masses, the 
strong man stands up to save the state from the trembling hands 
of democracy." How subsequently the 'final blow' is adminis-
21 Loewenstein 1935a, p. 580. 
22 Loewenstein 1935a, p. 580. 
23 Loewenstein l935a, p. 581. 
24 Loewenstein also makes the interesting observation that the leadership 
principle is in fact, a kind of 'democracy' in extremis. It has great appeal to 
the public, because it seems like literally eve1yone is able to seize power: no 
political, successful civil career or careful selection is required. The strong 
man just suddenly rises from the depths_ of the masses. See Loewenstein 
1935a, p. 582. 
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tered and the power is actually seized depends on the tempera-
ment of the leader and the actual political situation." 
National circumstances 
To what extent the fascist technique succeeds can vary, depend-
ing on national circumstances." National economic crisis and 
disillusionment seem to be the main factors that accelerate the 
rise of fascism. We already saw how fascism can use economic 
crises as a springboard. According to Loewenstein some see the 
educational level in a particular state as a countering inhibitory 
factor. States with an educated population would be less likely 
to fall prey to fascism. Loewenstein rightly disputes this view. 
Although in a number of autocratic states illiteracy was indeed 
considerable - such as Italy, Spain and Turkey - this could 
hardly be said of Germany and Austria; two countries that may 
well have had some of the best educated populations at that 
time. A much better guarantee against the dismantling of the 
democratic system seems to consist in a sufficiently established 
tradition of self-government. In none of the autocratic states 
democracy held long enough to wipe out the memory of auto-
cratic government. The population did not have the chance to 
learn to appreciate the advantages of a democratic govern-
ment." On the other hand; in all the states where a long and 
sustained tradition of democratic self-government is found, 
democracy still exists. We are therefore safe to conclude, 
Loewenstein continues, that the existence of a democratic tradi-
tion in a specific state functions as quite an accurate predictor 
for the survival of democracy in that state." 
25 Loewenstein 1935a, p. 583. For a comprehensive overview of the events 
that led to the dissolution of democracy in the case of the Nazi's, see: Jacobsen 
& Schlink, 'Introduction', in: Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis, Jacobsen, 
Arthur J. & Schlink, Bernhard (eds.), Berkeley: University of California Press 
2000. p. 8-14. 
26 Loewenstein 1935a, 584-588. 
27 Loewenstein 1935a, p. 587. Loewenstein points to Germany, Austria-
Hungary and Italy. 
28 Loewenstein 1935a, p. 588. In the remainder of the article (the second part) 
Loewenstein examines how democratic the future of different states promises 
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Preliminary conclusions 
When we analyze Loewenstein's 1935 diagnosis we can con-
clude the following. Without himself stating it explicitly, it 
follows from Loewenstein's analysis that democracy is vulner-
able in three ways. First, it is vulnerable due to its inherent 
structure: democracy is governed by compromise. Under nor-
mal conditions, this is an agreeable and civilized aspect of our 
self-government. In times of (economic) crisis, however, this 
search for compromise turns into indecision and inertia. This 
flaw is then easily exploited to discredit democracy. 
Second, democracy offers constitutional freedoms to its most 
hostile opponents, thereby allowing them to actually discredit 
and vilifY her. The dissemination of antidemocratic propaganda 
is protected by the freedom of speech, where the freedom of 
assembly grants antidemocratic parties the freedom to organize 
themselves around their antidemocratic aims. And, third, de-
mocracy even allows those hostile parties to access - after the 
election - the very institutions that they have preached to de-
stroy. 
The universal technique of fascism seems perfectly suited to 
these three weaknesses. Fascism is parasitic on democracy's 
tolerance. When the fascist technique is applied correctly and 
carefully, the establishment of an autocratic regime seems in-
evitable. National conditions can accelerate this process, like a 
deep economic crisis, or delay it, when a democratic tradition is 
present, but the outcome is ultimately inevitable when the fas-
cist technique is released with sufficient precision in a 'pacifist' 
democracy. Therefore the autocratic threat can only be met 
when the 'soft spots' in democracy are fortified. Democracy 
needs to abandon its passive, apathetic attitude and has to un-
dertake action against parties that threaten its survival. Democ-
racy should no longer be pacifist; it should become militant. 29 
to be. This part will not be further discussed here. See: Loewenstein 1935b, p. 
755-784. 
29 Loewenstein 1935a, p. 580. 
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'Democracy cannot be blamed if it learns from its ruthless en-
emy,' says Loewenstein. 30 
2.2 Loewenstein 's solution: militant democracy 
The solution Loewenstein anticipates in his 1935 article is 
worked out in more detail two years later in an article called 
'Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I & I!'. 
Fascism by the grace of democracy . 
According to Loewenstein, fascism in 1937 was a worldwide 
movement.31 This sense of urgency is reflected in his choice of 
words, where in 1935 he was somewhat moderate, he now 
warns of a 'Union of Europe's Regenerated Nations' and a 'fas-
cist International of the multi-colored shirts.'" He now even 
more explicitly than before links fascism to democracy: the 
success of fascism is based on its perfect adaptation to democ-
racy .33 Fascism is nothing more than a poli.tical technique th~t 
exploits the weaknesses of democracy. It IS no coherent phi-
losophy or ideology: fascism simply wants to rule. 34 The then 
new Spanish autocrat General Franco is exemplary for Loewen-
stein in this respect. Franco did not even have the slightest pre-
text of a substantiated program." Fascism will only seemingly 
have content by opposing certain aspects that it attributes to 
democracy. Leadership is contrasted with 'parliamentary cor-
ruption'; 'order' is contrasted with 'democratic. chaos' .. The 
politics of emotionalism are at the core of the fascist technique. 
The mass is played without noticing that it is being played. In 
30 Loewenstein 1935a, p. 593. 
31 Loewenstein 1937a, p. 417. 
32 Loewenstein l937a, p. 418. 
"Loewenstein !937a, p. 423. 
34 One can question this rather blunt assertion by Loewenstein, since for e~­
ample the Italian Fascism seemed fairly concerned with ideology, s~e on th1s: 
Mosse, George, The Culture of Western Europe, Bo~ld:r: Westv~e.w Pre~s 
1988, 343.357, Loewenstein, however, does see 'Naztsm as a poht1cal ph.t· 
losophy. See: Loewenstein, Karl, 'Legislation for the Defense of the State m 
Chili', Columbia Law Review 1944, vol. 44 no. 3, p. 407. 
35 Loewenstein 1937a, p. 423. 
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this way, says Loewenstein, fascism is the true child of the 
modern age of technological wonders and emotional masses.36 
Common front of democracies 
The internal pacifism of democracy seems to express itself ex-
ternally: democracies adhere to the idea that a 'war of ideas' 
should be avoided." Loewenstein criticizes this idea; it exem-
plifies the lack of coordination among democratic states. A first 
step towards democracy's resistance to autocracy" would be 
greater international cooperation among democratic states: they 
should form a common front. In each country where fascism 
seized power, this was made easier by the lack of unity on the 
side of its (international) opponents." The actuality of Loewen-
stein's plea is still evident when we read Robert Kagan's recent 
plea for a 'concert of democracies'. In The Return of History 
and the End of Dreams (2008), he categorizes the world along 
lines of democracy and autocracy as well.40 The democracies of 
the world need to find a way to secure their basic principles, 
now that they again face a serious challenge in the recurrence 
of autocratic powers. Kagan sees the 'concert of democracies' 
as a way to meet this challenge: democratic states need to close 
ranks and, amongst other things, offer support to democracy in 
states where democracy is at stake.41 In Kagan's view 'the de-
mocratic world should continue to promote political liberaliza-
tion; support human rights, including empowerment of women; 
and use its influence to support a free press and repeated elec-
36 Loewenstein 1937a, p. 423. Loewenstein suggests something similar in his 
1935 article when he says that 'modern technique has rationalized the most 
irrational feature of government-dynamics, the coup ditat '. See: Loewenstein 
1935a, p. 583. 
37 Loewenstein 1937a, p. 428·430. 
38 Loewenstein uses the terms autocracy, fascism and authoritarianism for the 
same type of government, namely one in which the separation of powers and a 
system of checks and balances is missing. See above: Section 2.1, 'The nature 
of the autocratic threat'. 
39 Loewenstein l937a, p. 428·430. 
4° Kagan, Robert, The Return of Histmy and the End of Dreams, New York: 
Vintage Books, A Division of Random House 2009. 
41 Kagan 2009, p. 101. 
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lions that will, if nothing else, continually shift power from the 
few to the many. ' 42 
Militant democracy 
However, it is not the proposed partnership of democratic states 
that is the most needed. The most important measures to be 
undertaken are internal, in the states themselves. Where 
Loewenstein first uncovered the weaknesses of democracy, then 
described how fascism parasitizes, or better yet, how it can only 
exist solely by virtue of democracy, he now finally comes to 
speak about the solution that he already proposed earlier, 
namely: militant democracy. It was already made clear that the 
weak spots of democracy need to be covered, but how this 
could be justified theoretically still remains to be seen. Or, as 
Loewenstein puts it: 'Democracy stands for fundamental rights, 
for fair play for all opinions, for free speech, assembly, press. 
How could it address itself to curtailing thes~ without destroy-
ing the very basis of its existence and justification?'" 
Precisely on this fundamental point, his answers are rather un-
satisfactory. First we are told that many countries already seem 
to be on the right way: they have let go of the 'democratic fun-
damentalism' they used to adhere to. One by one, the weak 
spots of democracy are covered by legislation so that fascism is 
left powerless. This will, however, not bring us any further on 
the theoretical issue. As so often with Loewenstein, the empiri-
cal and comparative dominate." Nevertheless, Loewenstein 
tries to find some kind of theoretical justification in an analogy 
42 Kagan 2009, p. I 02. 
43 Loewenstein l937a, p. 431. 
44 Much of Loewenstein's work consists of comparative studies of political 
institutions and legislation. Besides the articles discussed here, relevant exam-
ples, among others, are: Loewenstein, Karl, 'The demise of the French Consti-
tution of 1875', The American Political Science Review 1940, vol. 34 no. 5, p. 
867-895; Loewenstein, Karl, 'The Presidency Outside the United States: A 
Study in Comparative Political Institutions', The Journal of Politics 1949, vol. 
11 no. 3, p. 447A96; Loewenstein, Karl, 'The Union of Western Europe: 
illusions and reality, I. An appraisal of the methods', Columbia Law Review 
1952, vol. 52 no. I, p. 55-99. 
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with the state of emergency in times of external war. In times of 
siege, it is generally accepted that constitutional principles are 
suspended. In its struggle against anti-democratic forces, de-
mocracy however does not fight an external but an internal war. 
Loewenstein now states that just as in an external war, we can-
not let constitutional guarantees form an obstacle in the internal 
fight to preserve these constitutional guarantees for the future: 
'constitutions are dynamic to the extent that they allow for 
peaceful change by regular methods, but they have to be stiff-
ened and hardened when confronted by movements intent upon 
their destruction. ' 45 
This 'analogy' does, however, not actually bring us any fur-
ther, since the situation of an external war is in fact quite differ-
ent from that of an internal war. In external war it is undoubt-
edly legitimate for a democracy to defend itself: democracy as a 
totality confronts an externality, the hostile state. In internal war 
democracy's enemy is not external but an intrinsic part of itself. 
Especially when this part consists of a political party that le-
gitimately participates in democratic proceedings, it is not im-
mediately clear why in that case - if we want to stay true to our 
core democratic principles - the suspension of constitutional 
guarantees is justified. It is evident that action in these cases is 
desirable, but how such action is theoretically compatible with 
the fundamental principles of democracy remains unclear. It is a 
significant point Loewenstein leaves open here.46 
Preliminary conclusions 
After his 1935 diagnosis, we see a passionate Loewenstein in 
1937 advocating more resilience among, and within, democra-
cies. They need to cooperate more, but above all strengthen 
themselves internally: law must fortifY the soft spots in the de-
mocratic structure. Fascism is a parasitic technique that, when 
45 Loewenstein 1937a, p. 432. 
46 Loewenstein also addresses the extent to which ideas can be suppressed. 
His answer is quite straightforward: they cannot be suppressed. But since 
fascism is not an ideology or 'idea' but only a political technique this is not an 
issue here. See: Loewenstein 1937a, 431 w432. 
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given the chance, will exploit these weaknesses to seize power. 
Democratic fundamentalism should therefore be abandoned: 
democracy must become militant. Loewenstein thereby became 
the father of the concept of militant democracy, and he deserves 
credit for that. When the argument reaches its climax, however, 
and the fundamental question of the theoretical justification is 
posed, Loewenstein 's answers are fairly disappointing. The 
concept of militant democracy thus received a somewhat un-
handy father, one which - in the heat of the battle - could very 
well see wherein the threat existed and proposed a realistic rem-
edy against this threat, but whose ultimate theoretical justifica-
tion for that solution was gravely unsatisfactory." 
3. V AN DEN BERGH: DEMOCRACY AS SELF-CORRECTION 
In 1938 Loewenstein published another article, in which he 
meticulously analyzes exactly what kind of legal action the 
European countries have taken against political extremists.4" In 
a footnote to his discussion of the situation in the Netherlands 
he points to the Dutch constitutional theorist Van den Bergh 
and his inaugural lecture 'The democratic State and the non-
democratic parties'. Loewenstein notes that- to his knowledge 
- Van den Bergh's piece is the only European contribution to 
the problem of militant democracy, which arrives at similar 
conclusions as his own 1937 article." Loewenstein compliments 
Van den Bergh with his 'competent review' of the legal aspects 
of the exclusion of non-democratic parties. But if one reads Van 
den Bergh's text, one cannot help feeling that Loewenstein 
47 Loewenstein continues his discussion with a vast account of the measures 
undertaken in different European countries. These will not be discussed here. 
See: Loewenstein 1937b, p. 638-658. 
48 Loewenstein, Karl, 'Legislative Control of Political Extremism in European 
Democracies I', Columbia Law Review 1938, vol. 38 no. 4, p. 591-622 (here-
after: Loewenstein 1938a) and Loewenstein, Karl, 'Legislative Control of 
Political Extremism in European Democracies II', Columbia Law Review 
1938, vol. 38 no. 5, p. 725-774 (hereafter: Loewenstein 1938b). 
49 Loewenstein 1938a, p. 617. In that specific footnote Loewenstein refers 
back to footnote 14 in quoting his own work; we may assume that he means 
footnote 13, since his 1937 article is quoted in footnote 13 and not 14. 
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missed an important part of the portee of Van den Berg's inau-
gural lecture. Van den Bergh indeed discusses the legal possi-
bilities of actually forbidding political parties, but more impor-
tantly, he devotes considerable attention to the theoretical justi-
fication of such measures. In other words, exactly the point that 
Loewenstein left fairly untouched in his own articles. In the 
following we will discuss Van den Bergh's approach to this 
theoretical problem. 
3.1 The issue put into focus 
After a brief digression about the distinction between democra-
cies and dictatorial states -dictatorial states are non-democratic 
states, where no self-government exists50 - Van den Bergh 
states that for a fruitful discussion of the matter a few things 
need to be clarified. A lot has been written in the Netherlands 
and abroad, so Van den Bergh continues, on a question which is 
in fact not that interesting, namely: the question whether a de-
mocratic state may defend itself against violent parties that seek 
its abolition. The answer to this question is surely evident: 'po-
litical parties and individuals who decry, or by their attitude 
show, that they want to fight the existing law by illegal means, 
or, to fight it once they please, cannot expect otherwise than to 
be considered enemies by the State and to be treated accord-
ingly. ' 51 
The interesting question arises, however, when parties want to 
end democracy solely by lawful means, i.e. when parties par-
ticipate in elections to obtain a majority in parliament, and then 
by changing the law and constitution turn the democratic state 
into a non-democratic one." Loewenstein does not seem to see 
50 Van den Bergh notes that this definition is in line with popular parlance, 
although in political science, the term dictatorship is used for the temporary 
transfer of power to one person. See: Van den Bergh 1936, p. 4. The 'popular' 
definition of dictatorship Van den Bergh uses roughly corresponds to what 
Loewenstein means by 'autocratic'. 
51 Van den Bergh 1936, p. 5. All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are 
by the authors. 
52 Van den Bergh 1936, p. 6. 
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this vital distinction either. In his article of 1937 he does not 
define exactly against what kind of anti-democratic parties the 
concept of militant democracy attempts to protect democracy: is 
it only against hostile but violent parties, or also against hostile 
but non-violent parties? Nevertheless he seems to focus on vio-
lent parties, since he does discuss the creation of party militias 
and other semi-military groups that entail at least the possibility 
of actual violence. 53 His study of anti-extremist legislation in 
1938, however, opens with the explicit statement that by 'sub-
versive activities' are meant: 'all overt or covert acts of persons 
who advocate or practice doctrines which aim to overthrow the 
existing political order under the implied or admitted presuppo-
sition that to achieve their end, violence may to be utilized. 
Mere non-conformity with the fundamental principles of gov-
ernment and political philosophy embodied in the constitution 
will not (emphasis added, PC & BR) be considered as making a 
political movement subversive if conversion of the majority of 
the people to its tenets is to be attained solely by submitting the 
desired political change to the ballot through the medium of 
lawful propaganda within the existing laws.' 
Precisely when parties reject violence and adhere to only law-
ful means, the real issue is in focus and the arguments of the 
'democratic fundamentalist' are at its strongest. Because, is it 
not true, Van den Bergh asks, that all parties - if they have a 
sufficient majority - would want to make fundamental changes 
in the constitution?54 Are these parties, who attempt the aboli-
tion of democracy solely by legal means, not also fully entitled 
to participate in the democratic process, since we claim to be a 
democratic state? It is this issue that Van den Bergh attempts to 
answer on both the positive law and theoretical-philosophical 
side of the question. Here we will focus on the theoretical part 
of his argument. 55 
53 See: Loewenstein 1937a, p. 424-425. 
54 Van den Bergh 1936, p. 7. 
55 Concerning the legal aspects, he concludes that, based on a somewhat out-
dated law from 1855, it is indeed possible to prohibit non-democratic parties 
under Dutch Law, on the grounds that they are a threat to public order. See 
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3.2 A theoretical justification for militant democracy 
In a ~emocracy everyone has the right to try to win the people 
for hts beliefs and ideals. This even seems to be the true essence 
?f democracy: it treats all values as equal; it is value-neutral. It 
ts the peaceful struggle of minds that has to decide between 
those values. 56 Although Van den Bergh does not mention him 
this is clearly the view of the famous Austrian jurist and phi: 
losopher Hans Kelsen in his 1929 article 'Yom Wesen und 
Wert de~ Demokratie': democracy equally values and respects 
each politiCal behef. 57 In a later article called 'Yerteidigung der 
Demokratie' Kelsen asserts even more forcefully that a democ-
racy which tries to defend itself against parties that want to 
abolish it, ceases to be a democracy." 
Yan,den Bergh acknowledges that he also had been devoted 
to this view, but, so he says, after much contemplation, he came 
to the conclusion that it ultimately does not hold. 59 Besides the 
previously mentioned 'equality of ideas', one of the main char-
acteristics of democracy is its selfcorrecting capacity.60 In a 
democracy the circles of 'decision-makers' and 'stakeholders'-
ultimately - are one.61 The people feel the impact of its deci-
also: Van Poelje, G.A.,.'Bewogen Staatsrecht', in: Opstellen aangeboden aan 
Prof Mr. Van den Bergh ter gelegenheid van zijn aflreden als hoogleraar in 
het N~~erlandse Staatsrecht aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam, Alphen aan 
den R!Jn: N. Samson 1960, p. 3. 
56 Van den Bergh 1936, p. 8. 
57 s ee Kelsen, Hans, On the Essence and Value of Democracy ('Yam Wesen 
und Wert of Democracy'), in: Jacobson and Schlink 2000, p. 84-109. In this 
article Kelsen even explicitly links democracy to a relativistic worldview, see 
p. 106-109. On Kelsen's theory of democracy in general, see: Dreier, Horst, 
Rechtslehre, Staatssoziologie und Demokratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen Baden-
Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1990, p. 249-294. ' 
58 
See Ke.lsen, Hans, 'Verteidigung der Demokratie', in: Verteidigung der 
DemokratLe: Abhandlungen zur Demokratietheorie, TObingen: Mohr Siebeck 
2006 (1932), p. 237. 
59 Van den Bergh 1936, p. 9. 
60 Van den Bergh 1936, p. 9. 
61 
Van den Bergh 1936, p. 9. The resemblance with Schmitt's 'identity of the 
rulers and the ruled' ('Hersscher und Beherrschten') is striking, see: Schmitt, 
Car!, Verfassungslehre, Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot 1928, p. 
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sions, and because they are its own decisions, it can - in princi-
ple- revoke them again. The democratic self-government is, in 
this way, nothing more than a state of 'permanent self-
correction'. If we oversee the wide spectrum of possible views 
and ideas in a democracy, it comes to our notice that one belief 
in this respect is distinct from the others, namely the belief that 
democracy should be abolished." This latter belief, when car-
ried out, constitutes an irreversible fact. This brings this belief 
into conflict with the 'self-correcting nature' of democracy and 
thus threatens the essence of democracy. Van den Bergh does 
not say it in such strong words, but based on these considera-
tions, we could say that the essence of democracy does not lie 
merely in its value-neutrality, but also in its self-correcting abil-
ity. Seeing democracy as the combination of both makes it now 
theoretically justifiable to give all but one belief an equal treat-
ment, the one belief being the idea that democracy should be 
abolished. Van den Bergh thus hands us a conception of democ-
racy that makes the desirable - the prohibition of anti-
democratic parties- theoretically justifiable." 
4. A BRIEF RECAPITULATION AND TRANSITION TO THE 
FOLLOWING 
It is to Loewenstein's credit that he identified the weaknesses of 
democracy and so clearly and accurately described how a new 
phenomenon at that time- fascism- exploits these weaknesses. 
The origins of militant democracy - as we have seen - are 
234. 
62 Van den Bergh 1936, p. 9. 
63 Van den Bergh himself appears not to be entirely aware of the elegance of 
his thesis when later on in his article he argues for a 'value-laden democracy' 
by stating that parties must at least accept certain 'inviolable moral and legal 
principles' before they can be allowed access to the democratic process. First 
parties have to agree to have a discussion at all, based on certain principles, or 
in as in the French saying: 'Pour discuter il faut ~tre d'accord'. See: Van den 
Bergh 1936, p. 24-28. Several years later Karl Popper took a similar stance 
when he declared that one should be intolerant against intolerance, when the 
intolerant denounce all argument. See: Popper 1995, p. 602 (note 4 to chapter 
7 of volume I). 
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therefore strongly situated in the struggle against fascism. A 
'militant democracy' is seen as a democracy that fortifies its 
weaknesses against the ruthless political technique of fascism. 
Two theoretical issues Loewenstein more or less leaves be-
hind are, however, discussed by Van den Bergh. First, Van den 
Bergh argues for a clear distinction between the question 
whether a democracy is entitled to take action against violent 
anti-democratic groups (answer: obviously 'yes') and the ques-
tion whether a democracy can defend itself against non-violent 
anti-democratic groups. This puts the issue more into focus. 
Van den Bergh's own answer lies in the self-correcting nature 
of democracy. This character implies that all but one idea has to 
be treated equally by democracy, namely the idea that democ-
racy should be abolished. Against such groups democracy may 
rightfully act. 
Thus, the concept of 'militant democracy' is actually given 
two fathers. On the one hand, there is Loewenstein, who after a 
precise analysis of the weaknesses of democracy, motivated by 
urgency and without too much theoretical scruples, proclaimed 
in 193 5 that democracy should become more resilient and later 
elaborates this point in more detail in his 1937 article. On the 
other hand there is the more theoretically inclined Van den 
Bergh, who in 1936 provided the first theoretical foundation for 
'militant democracy', without actually using the term.64 
Loewenstein and Van den Bergh have thus laid the ground-
work for a concept that has become the starting point for, or a 
core principle in, the constitutional systems of several modern 
states. 65 Obviously they could at that time not foresee all theo-
retical issues related to the concept of militant democracy. 
64 It appears to be a safe assumption that Loewenstein and Van den Bergh at 
least until 1938 did not know each other's work. Van den Bergh says that he, 
despite 'diligent searching in Dutch and foreign literature', failed to find 
'anything of any importance.' Loewenstein does not cite Van den Bergh's 
inaugural lecture in his 1937 article and only refers to it in his comparative 
study in 1938. This under the indication that Van den Bergh reached 'similar 
conclusions' as he himself reached in his 1937 article, thereby suggesting that 
Van den Bergh's text was not available to him in 1937. 
65 See the above-mentioned impressive survey edited by Thiel: Thiel2009. 
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Therefore, in the following part of this contribution we will 
focus on a few of the theoretical issues to which militant de-
mocracy gives rise. 
5. THE CONCEPT OF A MILITANT DEMOCRACY 
First of all we have to acknowledge that the whole concept of 
'militant democracy' is rather vague. Already in the discussion 
of the ideas of Van den Bergh and Loewenstein we see they 
give very different interpretations of it. This difficulty only 
increases when we take more authors in the focus of our atten-
tion (Kelsen, Schmitt, to name only a few, some of them treated 
in the contribution of Ellian to this volume). We hope to bring 
some clarification to this issue by distinguishing three concepts 
of militant democracy. There is, first, the idea that democracy is 
an ideal with universal significance. Second, there is the conten-
tion that democracy may not be abolished by democratic means. 
Third, there is the idea that certain civil rights and liberties are 
essential to democracy and that they may not be violated with-
out invalidating the democratic ideal as such. These three con-
ceptions of 'militant democracy' are related and intertwined but 
for the sake of clarity they should also be distinguished. We 
will show that each concept of militant democracy has a promi-
nent porte-parole. The first concept is defended by Robert Ka-
gan, the second by George van den Bergh, the third by Karl 
Loewenstein. 
5.1 The first concept of militant democracy: democracy as an 
ideal with universal significance 
In the previous paragraphs we cited Robert Kagan 's The Return 
of History and the End of Dreams (2008).66 The title of this 
book makes an allusion to Fukuyama's influential essay The 
End of History (1989). This 'end' would have taken place when 
in 1989 the Berlin Wall fell, and all autocratic regimes had to 
66 Kagan 2009. 
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make place for liberal democracies." Kagan contends that the 
idea of an ideological 'end of history' was based on a set of 
historical circumstances that proved fleeting. Although commu-
nism passed from the scene, challengers to democracy did not. 
Here he refers to China and Russia, two autocratic regimes, not 
simply as a matter of fact, but also because the leaders of those 
countries, backed by a substantial part of the population, believe 
that autocracy is a superior form of government to democracy. 
Russia is now a kind of 'czarist' political system. The most 
important political decisions are taken by one man: Vladimir 
Putin. Putin and his powerful coterie pay lip service to 'democ-
racy' but they give the concept a totally different meaning from 
what is understood by it in the West. The Russian regime is 
only 'democratic' in the sense that the Russian people are con-
sulted, btit the people have no rights against the government. 
The legal system is used as a tool against political opponents. 
The world waits for change, Kagan writes, but in the meantime 
two of the world's largest nations, China and Russia, have gov-
ernments committed to autocratic rule. And what is most impor-
tant: this is not likely to change in the immediate future. 
The power and durability of these autocracies will shape the in-
ternational system in profound ways. The world is not about to 
embark on a new ideological struggle of the kind that dominated 
the Cold War. But the new era, rather than being a time of 'uni-
versal values', will be one of growing tensions and sometimes 
conrrontation between the forces of democracy and the forces of 
autocracy. 68 
Again, the Chinese and Russian leaders are not de facto auto-
cratic leaders; they believe in autocracy. This is hard to under-
stand for political leaders in the West, Kagan tells us, but never-
theless true. The Chinese and Russian leaders believe in the 
67 Fukuyama, Francis, 'The End of History?', in: The National Interest 1989, 
No. 16, p. 3~18, elaborated upon in Fukuyama, Francis, 'A Reply to my Crit-
ics', in: The National Interest 1989, No. 18, p. 21-28 and later abandoned in 
Fukuyama, Francis, After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads, London: 
Profile Books 2006. 
68 Kagan 2009, p. 58. 
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superiority of their form of government in the same way Plato 
and Aristotle were averse to democracy and 'every other great 
thinker prior to the eighteenth century' .69 
It is on the basis of these convictions that the Russians and 
Chinese oppose interventions in their sovereign states because 
they abuse the rights of their people. The interventionist empha-
sis on human rights, according to the Chinese, is seen as only a 
new and potent strategy of global domination by 'liberal he-
gemonism' .70 It is against this resurgence of autocracy that de-
mocratic states under the leadership of the United States of 
America try to convince the rest of the world of the superior 
quality of the democratic system. According to Kagan this ten-
sion between autocracy and democracy will be with us for the 
coming time. This emphasis on democracy as something worth 
defending, not only at home but also abroad, will be an impor-
tant source of conflict for the coming years. This is inherent to 
the presuppositions of the democratic frame of mind. What are 
these? Kagan formulates them as follows: 
Only the liberal creed grants the right - the belief that all men are 
created equal and have certain inalienable rights that must not be 
abridged by governments; that governments derive their power 
and legitimacy only from the consent of the governed and have a 
duty to protect their citizens' right to life, liberty, and property.71 
Kagan underscores that to those who share this liberal faith, 
this commitment to democracy, it can be right to defend these 
principles in their foreign policies and even go to war for those 
principles." 
We think Kagan is right. The liberal creed that animates the 
spirit of democracy is a universal creed. There is no sense in 
69 Kagan 2009, p. 59. Which may be a somewhat sweeping statement, al-
though it is true that even in the nineteenth century there was widespread 
opposition towards the democratic idea. See on this: Lippincott, Benjamin 
Evans, Victorian Critics of Democracy, Minneapolis: The University of Min-
nesota Press 1938. 
7° Kagan 2009, p. 65. 
71 Kagan 2009, p. 66 
72 Kagan 2009, p. 67. 
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defending that only citizens in the Western world have the right 
to 'life, liberty, and property' or 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness'. Everywhere where autocratic leaders trample upon 
these rights, democratic states have at least to voice protest that 
by doing so elementary human rights are violated. In that sense 
the democratic creed is universal, missionary, if you want, or-
and now we come to the central concept- 'militant'. 
Militant democracy as the attempt to foster democracy all over 
the world 
For all the cynical undertones and his emphasis on description 
(not prescription), Kagan is not opposed to militancy when it 
comes to the dispersion of democratic ideas globally. He dis-
cerns three threats to the democratic tradition: China and Russia 
(we have seen that already), but also Islamist movements in the 
Middle East. They all lead the revolt against democracy. Yet, 
there are many tendencies that indicate the force of democracy 
in parts of the world where it seemed chanceless some years 
ago. NGO's interfere in domestic politics. There are also inter-
national organizations such as the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe who monitor elections. International law 
experts develop new concepts like 'the responsibility to pro-
tect"' and 'voluntary sovereignty waiver', which are not easy to 
understand merely only against the backdrop of the democratic 
ideal.74 These are all universalist ideals, says Kagan:" In theory, 
these innovations apply to everyone. In practice, they chiefly 
provide democratic nations the right to intervene in the affairs 
of nondemocratic ideas. "75 
73 See on this concept Molier, Gelijn, 'Libie als Lakmoesproef voor 'Res~ 
ponsibility to Protect' als internationaal rechtelijk beginsel', 2010, in: 
www.civismundi.nl, pp. l-13. See further on this: Thakur, Ramesh, The Re-
sponsbility to Protect: Norms, Laws and the Use of Force in International 
Politics, Londen: Routledge, 2011. 
74 Kagan 2009, p. 64. 
75 
Kagan, 2009, p. 64. See on democracy and humanitarian intervention also: 
Ignatieff, Michael, 'Human Rights, Sovereignty and Intervention', in: Nicho-
las Owen, ed., Human Rights and Wrongs, The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 
2001, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002, pp. 52-87; Todorov, Tzvetan, 
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But this 'interventionist emphasis on human rights' is heavily 
lambasted, as one may expect, by China, by Russia and by the 
Islamists in the Middle East and in other parts of the world. 
They get support for that protest from critics in the West who 
castigate 'liberal hegemonism'. According to Kagan this global 
competition between democratic and autocratic governments 
will become a dominant feature in the twenty-first-century 
world." 
The defense of democracy and the attempt to foster democra-
cies all over the world does not necessarily have to result in 
military interventions, of course.77 Kagan stresses that although 
'there is little sense of shared morality and common values 
among the great powers' ,78 there is certainly consent between 
democratic states. It might be possible, so Kagan continues- as 
already briefly discussed in section 2.2 above -, to establish a 
global concert or league of democracies, 'perhaps informally at 
first' .79 The aim of this gathering could be to hold regular meet-
ings and consultations among democratic nations on the issues 
of the day. 'Such an institution could bring together Asian and 
Pacific nations such as Japan, Australia, and India with the EU 
and NATO nations of Europe and North America, along with 
other democracies, such as Brazil. ' 80 This could signal a 'corn-
'Right to Intervene or Duty to Assist?', in: Ibid., pp. 28-51; Todorov, Tzvetan, 
Le Nouveau Desordre mondial: Rejlexions d'un Europien, Preface de Stanley 
Hoffmann, Robert Laffont, Paris 2003; Cliteur, Paul, 'Self-Defence and Ter-
rorism', in: Arthur Eyffinger, Alan Stephens, Sam Muller, eds., Self-Defence 
as a Fundamental Principle, The Hague: Hague Academic Press 2009, pp. 67-
!03. 
76 Kagan 2009, p. 72. 
77 For which enthousiasm seems to be at a low ebb nowadays. See for a hu-
morous and interesting criticism of this: Hulsman, John C., and Mitchell, A 
Wess, The Godfather Doctrine: A Foreign Policy Parable, Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press 2009, contrasting favorable with John 
Gray's ferocious onslaught on Enlightenment principles in among others: 
Gray, John, Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia, Lon~ 
don: Alien Lane, Penguin Books 2007 and Gray, John, Gray's Anatomy: 
Selected Writings, London: Allan Lane, Penguin Books 2009. 
78 Kagan 2009, p. 78. 
79 Kagan 2009, p. 97. 
8° Kagan 2009, p. 97. 
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mitment to the democratic idea'."' It does not require a 'blind 
crusade on behalf of democracy everywhere at all times', nei-
ther does it favor 'violent confrontation with the autocratic 
powers' where such confrontation could be avoided, but it 
could mean that the world's democracies showed solidarity for 
one another. The democratic world should continue to promote 
'political liberalization; support for human rights, including the 
empowerment of women; and its influence to support a free 
press and repeated elections that will, if nothing else, continu-
ally shift power from the few to the many.'"' 
W. T. Stace 's defense of democratic civilization 
In the previous paragraphs we referred to Loewenstein, who is 
more of an empirical thinker than Van den Bergh, who provided 
us witb a normative analysis of why democracy has to be 'mili-
tant'. If we try to categorize Kagan in the typology of norma-
tive/descriptive he is predominantly not a normative author. lt 
seems fair to remark that he hardly does more than Fukuyama 
had done in 1989: simply observing that in the world around us 
some tendencies are to be distinguished. Kagan now observes, 
as a matter of course, that autocracies do not die out easily (as 
Fukuyama also had to experience soon after having published 
his much discussed essay, and was spelled out to him by Sam-
uel Huntington four years after the publication of his 'End-
thesis').83 But neither do democracies. At the end of his essay he 
proclaims that the future of the international order 'will be 
shaped by those who have the power'.84 In this context 'power' 
does not only mean economic power or military power, but also 
'will'. The will to convince others of the rightness of the de-
81 Kagan 2009, p. 98. 
82 Kagan 2009, p. !02. 
83 Huntington, Samuel, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', in: Foreign Affairs 
1993, p. 22~49, elaborated upon in: Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of 
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon & Schus-
ter !996. 
84 Kagan 2009, p. !05. 
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mocratic principles. 'The question is whether the world's de-
mocracies will again rise to that challenge'." 
This is perfectly true. But neither Kagan, nor Fukuyama and 
even less Huntington are very helpful in providing legitimacy 
for the democratic principle. As said before, as empirical social 
scientists they take the world as it presents itself to us. They are 
not political philosophers trying to develop an argument why 
the non-democratic world should adopt democracy as a matter 
of principle, neither do they foster democratic self-confidence 
by explaining why democracy is superior to autocracy. Kagan 
has the will and ambition to defend democracy as a universal 
ideal, but he lacks the argumentative coherence to bring this 
about. Yet this seems necessary, not in the last instance because 
the first concept of militant democracy has to be bolstered be-
fore we can defend a second (Van den Bergh) and third 
(Loewenstein) dimension of militant democracy. In other 
words, why should we follow Van den Bergh's argument that 
democracy may not abolish itself by democratic means if de-
mocracy is not a universal ideal? 
For a normative bolstering of the theory of militant democ-
racy in the sense outlined, we need other authors than Fuku-
yama, Kagan, or Huntington. Fortunately, there are several of 
them. There is a multitude of competent philosophers, intellec-
tuals and politicians who have defended the right of democracy 
to claim its rights as a universal mode of government, superior 
to autocracy and all other contenders. Especially before and 
during the Second World War an impressive gallery of thinkers 
presented itself, explaining what was at stake in the fight 
against Fascism, Nazism and other autocratic movements. Har-
old Nicolson did this in Why Britain is at War (1939),86 and 
Harold Laski in Reflections on the Revolution of our Time 
(1943).87 But also T.S. Eliot's plea for Christianity in The Idea 
85 Kagan 2009, p. 105. 
86 Nicolson, Harold, Why Britain is at War, with a new introduction by An-
drew Roberts. London: Penguin Books 20 I 0 ( 1939). 
87 Laski, Harold J., Reflections on the Revolution of our Time, London: 
George Alien & Unwin Ltd 1944. 
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of a Christian Society (1939) is only understandable against the 
backdrop of a perceived 'pagan' rise of dictatorships all over 
the world." Also the resurgence of the idea of inalienable hu-
man rights after the Second World war is unthinkable without 
the expositions of the war aims by Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
in his The Four Freedoms (1941)89 and H.G. Wells in The 
Rights of Man, or What are we Fighting For? (1940). 90 One of 
the most impressive manifestations of these expositions of the 
value of democratic civilization was, although not well known, 
Waiter Terence Stace's The Destiny of Western Man (1942). 91 
The background of Stace's book is, of course, the Second 
World War, and the attack that non-democratic, totalitarian or 
autocratic states launched against the foundations of the democ-
ratic faith. As Stace explains in the preface to his book: the 
totalitarialipeoples dispute the axioms of democracy. They do 
not admit that 'all men are created equal'. They do not agree 
that the individual has certain 'inalienable rights'. They do not 
even think that liberty is that important." They have developed 
a different conception of the good life than the people living in 
democracies, and their conception of the good life 'is rapidly 
incarnating itself in a new set of institutions, a new civiliza-
tion' .93 
88 Eliot, T.S., The Idea of a Christian Society, London: Faber and Faber 1939. 
89 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 'The Four Freedoms' ( 1941 ), in: Brian MacAr-
thur, (ed.), The Penguin Book of Twentieth-Centwy Speeches, Harmonds-
worth: Penguin Books 1993, p. 197-201. See on this speech: Cliteur, Paul, 
'Liberal Globalism: A Defence\ in: Eva Nieuwenhuys, ed., Neo-libera/ Glob-
alism and Social Sustainable Globalisation, Leiden, Boston: Brill Publishers, 
2006, p. 15-39. 
90 Wells, H.G., The Rights of Man, or What are we Fighting for?, Harmonds-
worth: Penguin Books 1940. See on Wells: Klug, Francesca, 'In the footsteps 
of H. G. Wells', in: The New Statesman, 9 October 2000 and Burgers, J.H., 
'The Road to San Francisco: The Revival of the Human Rights Idea in the 
Twentieth Century", in: Human Rights Quarterly 1992. p. 44 7-4 77. 
91 Stace, W.T., The Destiny of Western Man, New York: Reynal & Hitchcock 
I942. 
92 Stace 1942, p. vii. 
93 Stace 1942, p. vii. 
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Stace thinks the democratic principles can be defended 
against the onslaught that is being undertaken by autocratic 
regimes and their ideologues.94 And he is confident such a de-
fense is possible. This is based on his stance that some moral 
principles are true, others are false. He is an adherent of the 
view- generally discredited by relativists -that a moral princi-
ple can be true in exactly the same sense as the law of gravita-
tion is true.95 As in his other books, such as The Concept of 
Morals (1937)96 and A Critical History of Greek Philosophy 
(1920),97 Stace takes us with him on an impressive tour 
d'horizon along the western philosophical tradition discussing 
the Greek and Jewish origins of western civilization. And he 
claims that totalitarian civilization aims at quite a different way 
of life than democratic civilization." 
A civilization is an ethical concept. Every civilization embod-
ies some ethos. What we are witnessing now is a 'battle be-
tween civilizations', a 'battle between ethical ideas'." And the 
antithesis between democratic and totalitarian civilization he 
sees not as a 'civil dispute between two branches of a single 
civilization, but as a clash of civilizations' .100 
There we have the idea that was taken up much later by Ber-
nard Lewis in his important essay The Roots of Muslim Rage 
(1990) 101 and elaborated upon by Samuel Huntington in The 
Clash of Civilizations (1993). In an detailed and consistent ar-
94 He considers Nietzsche, with his emphasis on the Will to Power, to be the 
ideologue of fascism, in the same way as Socrates, Plato and Aristotle with 
their commitment to reason provided us the basis for democratic thought. 
95 Stace 1942, p. 17. 
96 Stace, W.T., The Concept of Morals, London: Macmillan 1937. 
97 Stace, W.T., A Critical History of Greek Philosophy, London, New York: 
Macmillan & Co LTD, 1960 (1920). 
98 Stace 1942., p. 57. 
99 Stace 1942, p. 81. 
100 Stace 1942, p. 203. 
101 Lewis, Bernard, 'The Roots of Muslim Rage', in: The Atlantic Monthly 
1990, also included in: From Babe! to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle 
East, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson 2004, p. 319-331. It seems Lewis used 
the term 'clash of civilizations' also during a meeting in Washington in 1957, 
which brings us closer to Stace's use in his book in 1942. 
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gument, Stace tries to explain why democratic civilization is 
superiorto totalitarian civilization. 
Within the confines of this contribution we cannot do justice 
to Stace's subtle and intricate analysis of the nature of democ-
racy and its counterpart, but what seems to be clear is that every 
attempt to defend democracy (and this is what the theoreticians 
of 'militant democracy' have to accomplish) is heavily depend-
ent on a convincing argument why the democratic idea is worth 
defending at all. 102 
This idea of 'militant democracy' as something to be de-
fended is the first and perhaps primordial idea of militant de-
mocracy. Once we analyze the presuppositions of the democ-
ratic faith as described by Kagan and thoroughly analyzed by 
Stace, we see this is not a relativist creed, but based on a con-
ception. of the human individual as of infinite value, and in pos-
session of certain inalienable rights. It is therefore, as Kagan 
remarks, that democracies cannot do anything else than 'offer 
support to democracy in states where democracy is at stake'. 
Although this type of 'militant democracy' is at a low ebb 
nowadays, and many public intellectuals depict the defense of 
democracy as a kind of 'liberal hegemonism', 103 we have to 
remind ourselves that militant democracy may be indispensable 
as Loewenstein and Van den Bergh argue, but that their con-
cepts of militant democracy are perhaps heavily dependent on 
this first concept. Why this is the case we will explain in the 
next paragraph. 
102 Both Richard Rorty's, 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', in: 
Richard Rorty, Objectivism, Relativism, and Truth, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 
I, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. p. 175-197 as 
Hans Kelsen's 'Foundations of Democracy', in: Ethics 1955, Vol. LXVI No. 
1, Part II, p. 1-10 I fail to do this because of the inherent relativism of these 
accounts of the democratic idea. 
103 See e.g.: Fisk, Robert, The Age of the Warrior: Selected Writings, London: 
Fourth Estate 2008. 
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5.2 The second concept: democracy resistant to its own aboli-
tion 
A second conception of militant democracy is the conception 
that proclaims that democracy is not held to tolerate its own 
abolition by democratic means in the sense of majority vote. 
This is the concept that Van den Bergh seems to have in view. 
The concept of militant democracy arose against the back-
ground that Loewenstein and V an den Berg described in their 
essays. Stace and Kagan write against the background of sover-
eign nation-states: both democratic and authoritarian or auto-
cratic. Here the 'militancy' is enshrined in the defense that de-
mocracies pose and have to pose towards the autocratic civiliza-
tion (either verbal, like Stace does, or military, like the US mili-
tary forces did in the struggle against Hitler). The context of 
V an den Bergh and Loewenstein is different. The question here 
is this: democracy means respecting the decisions that are being 
taken by majority vote. But does democracy also imply respect 
for the decision that democracy has to be abolished? Can a de-
mocratic majority collectively decide that after having experi-
mented with democracy for some time, it is not such a good 
idea after all? And that dictatorship is preferable? Or does the 
democratic creed necessitate that we take measures against the 
Sir Oswald Mosley's (1896-1980) of this world who try to un-
dermine democracy from within?104 As Joseph Goebbels said: 
We enter the Reichstag to ann ourselves with democracy's 
weapons. If democracy is foolish enough to give us free railway 
passes and salaries, that is its problem. It does not concern us. 
Any way of bringing about the revolution is fine by us.( ... ) We 
are coming neither as friends or neutrals. We come as enemies! 
As the wolf attacks the sheep, so come we. 105 
104 Mosley is also mentioned by Loewenstein, see Loewenstein 1937a, p. 424~ 
425. 
105 Goebbels, Joseph, 'Why do we want to join the Reichstag?' (translated by 
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'Militant democracy' in its second meaning proclaims that 
from the nature of the democratic creed we have to be on our 
guard against the people who undermine democracy from 
within. 
Democracy and suicide 
The most common analogy to think about these matters seems 
to be 'suicide' as a decision of the human individual. It is often 
said that a conception of democracy that respects its own aboli-
tion is 'suicidal', which may be true, but does not settle the 
question. We feel inclined to prevent someone from committing 
suicide, but are we morally obliged to do so? And what if the 
person tells us he had pondered over the question of the mean-
ing of life, his own life, very carefully, like Tolstoy'06 and Jean 
Amery, have done and that he, after careful consideration, 
comes to the conclusion that suffering and depredation are 
prevalent over happiness and satisfaction so he wants to termi-
nate his own life? Should we stop him? Or should we respect 
his autonomy as a human being, even in the choices we our-
selves do not consider necessary or even acceptable? 107 
The analogy with suicide and the abolition of democracy by a 
democratic majority is far from flawless, however, because with 
suicide the decision is in the hands of the human individual 
deciding about his own destiny. It is for this reason that the 
German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer rejects the taboo that 
the monotheist religions have cast over the decision to kill one-
self. This taboo is rejectionable because 'doch offenbar jeder 
auf nichts in der Welt ein so unbestreitbares Recht hat wie auf 
seine eigene Person und sein Leben'. 108 
Why would it be different with a democratic majority? The 
answer may be this: in the case of a democratic majority abol-
106 See: Tolstoy, Leo, A Confession and Other Religious Writings, London: 
Penguin Books 1987. 
107 See on the philosophical aspects of suicide: Donnelly, John, ed., Suicide: 
Contempormy Issues, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, New York 1990. 
108 Schopenhauer, Arthur, Parerga und Paralipomena, Kleine Philosophische 
Schriften 11, in: Siimtliche Werke, Band V, Frankfurt am Main: Cotta~ 
Verlag/lnsel-Verlag 1965 (1851). p. 361. 
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ishing democracy it is a decision by a majority overriding the 
interests of a minority. Besides, it is the decision of the present 
generation trampling on the rights of future generations. For 
that very reason most democracies have considered it advisable 
to entrench ce1tain constitutional provisions by making them 
more difficult to change. Constitutions which incorporate such 
provisions are called 'rigid constitutions'. The notion of a rigid 
constitution is a constitutional device to make it more resistant 
towards the fickle temper of democratic majorities. 109 
The notion of a 'rigid constitution' as commonly interpreted 
does not mean that the constitutional clauses are completely 
unchangeable. It only means that for changing the constitution 
one needs a qualified majority of two third of the votes in both 
chambers of parliament. Nevertheless, we may pose the ques-
tion whether some clauses of the constitution are so important 
to the foundations of democracy that we should make them 
completely unassailable. That would be the case with e.g. the 
clauses of the constitution on which the democratic character of 
the form of government hinges. Let us therefore direct our at-
tention to the Dutch constitution, particularly to those parts that 
deal with democracy. 
Clauses about democracy in the Dutch constitution 
But first a note of caution. Legend has it that Napoleon said: 'A 
constitution should be short and obscure'. 110 The Dutch consti-
tution is not particularly short, but obscure it certainly is. The 
Dutch constitution has no preamble explaining the foundations 
of the organization of the state and its basic provisions can only 
be understood against the background of a thorough knowledge 
of Dutch constitutional history.'" Nevertheless, against the 
109 See on the notion of rigid and flexible constitutions: Bryce, Jarnes, 'Flexi~ 
ble and rigid constitutions', in: Studies in history and jurisprudence, Volume 
I, Aelen: Scientia Verlag Aelen 1980 ( 1901 ), p. 145-252. 
11° Cited in: SchwObel, Christine E.J ., Global Constitutionalism in !nterna~ 
tional Legal Perspective, Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 20 I!, 
p. 11. 
111 On this: Cliteur, P.B. and Voermans, W.J.M., Preambules, Alphen aan en 
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background of an understanding of the basic principles of con-
stitutional democracy, it is possible to highlight some clauses of 
the constitution as essential for the maintenance of the democ-
ratic character of the Dutch polity. Let us analyze some exam-
ples. 
Art. 42.1 runs: 'The Government shall comprise the King and 
the Ministers' ('De regering wordt gevormd door de Koning en 
de ministers'). 
Art. 42.2 runs: 'The Ministers, and not the King, shall be re-
sponsible for acts of government' ('De Koning is onschendbaar; 
de ministers zijn verantwoordelijk'). 
Art. 50 runs: 'The States General shall represent the entire peo-
ple of the Netherlands' ('De Staten-Generaal vertegenwoordigen 
het gehele Nederlandse volk'). 
Art. 54 runs: 'The members of the Lower House shall be elected 
directly by Dutch nationals who have attained the age of eight-
een' ('De leden van de Tweede Kamer warden rechtstreeks ge-
kozen door de Nederlanders die de leeftijd van achttien jaar heb-
ben bereikt'). 
Art. 81 states: 'Acts of Parliament shall be enacted jointly by the 
Government and the States General' ('De vaststelling van de 
wetten geschiedt door de regering en de Staten-Generaal 
gezamenlijk'). 
What these clauses have in common is that they express the 
democratic character of the Dutch polity. Like in all constitu-
tional monarchies the constitution contains some things that are 
not essential for the democratic character of the state, and in 
fact senseless when taken literally. That is the case with the 
central position of the King in the written constitution. This is 
not in accordance with the actual functioning of present day 
democracies. What Phillip Allot! writes about the position of 
the British Queen is also true of the Dutch Queen. Allot! writes: 
'The British people as they constitute the society which consti-
tutes them as a people, communicate with themselves in a fa-
miliar fog of half-formed ideas and a half-forgotten past.' 112 Part 
112 
Allottt, Phi lip, 'The Theory of the British Constitution', in: Hyman Gross 
and Ross Harrison, eds., Jurisprudence. Cambridge Essays, Oxford: Claren~ 
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of that 'fog' is that the British Constitution is articulated around 
the fantasy of an absolute monarchy. It is 'a fantasy of palaces 
and glass coaches and orders of chivalry, a fantasy in which the 
representatives of the people present Humble Addresses to Her 
Majesty, and statements of government policy are published By 
Command of Her Majesty, in which the monarch reads the gov-
ernment's programme for the parliamentary session seated upon 
a gilded throne, in the presence of tiaraed duchesses and earls in 
ermine overheard by the representatives of the people who re-
main standing.' Ill This fantasy also entails that legislation be-
comes law when the monarch assents. The British constitution, 
Allot! says, 'rests upon a fantasy which is, and is known to be, a 
lie. ,114 
The same is true of the Dutch constitution. Read out of con-
text and without knowledge of the Dutch constitutional history, 
art. 42.2 would give the impression that the King is a very im-
portant figure. But that fantasy evaporates once we realize that 
where the responsibility lies, also the power is vested. So the 
ministers are ultimately in charge. They make the decisions that 
direct the state. Those ministers are accountable to Parliament, 
the representatives of the people. And the ministers cannot stay 
in power against the will of Parliament (States General). That 
makes the Netherlands 'a democracy' .115 
One of the most important actions the state can undertake is 
making laws, binding upon the whole population. These laws 
are made by the Government, together with the States General, 
as art. 81 reveals. So the laws are an expression of the will of 
the people. That too makes the Netherlands a democracy. 
Now let us address the problems that Van den Berg and 
Loewenstein pondered over. Suppose a parliamentary majority 
decides to abolish democracy, i.e. the ministers would be sent 
don Press 1992, pp. 173-205, p. 188. 
Ill Allott 1992, p. 188. 
114 Allott 1992, p. 188. 
115 See on this: Cliteur, Paul, 'Indien verantwoordelijk dan bevoegd?', in: 
M.C. Burkens, E.C.M. Jurgens, A.K. Koekkoek, J.J. Vis, red., Gelet op de 
Grondwet, Den Haag: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrela-
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home and eliminated from the Dutch constitution, the States 
General would be changed in a kind of advisory council (not 
binding) and the King would, again, take full control. 116 Accord-
ing to some conceptions of democracy that would nonetheless 
be 'democratic' when it happens by majority vote (Kelsen). 117 
But Van den Berg does not think so. The adherents of the con-
cept of militant democracy in the second meaning of the term, 
like Van den Bergh, contest this interpretation of the idea of 
democracy. Democracy means majority vote. But there is one 
expression of the democratic will that can never be accepted: 
the decision to abolish the democratic system altogether. So 
even in a peaceful way and in accordance with the rules of de-
mocratic procedure democracy cannot eliminate itself. A de-
mocratic decision to change the structure of the state in an au-
tocracy .will"not be accepted as 'democratic'. 
Is advocating the abolition of democracy allowed? 
Now that brings us to the question: when is that danger loom-
ing? And with this question we have the linchpin between the 
second concept of militant democracy and the third concept. 
The parliamentary majority to abolish democracy does not like 
manna, i.e. suddenly, fall from heaven (Exodus 16:12-16). Anti-
democratic parties have a history. They prepare themselves for 
· the final takeover, as is described so well by Loewenstein and 
other authors. 118 They use civil liberties to eviscerate democracy 
from within. They use freedom of speech, freedom of religion, 
the freedom of assembly and other freedoms to plot for the final 
takeover. And again the question arises: when to intervene? Is it 
allowed to prohibit anti-democratic parties to make propaganda 
for their cause? Should we allow it to disperse anti-democratic 
views? Should we, returning to Kagan's essay, allow the fol-
lowers of Putin, the Chinese autocrats and the Islamists to ad-
116 Or some man on horseback, see what Kagan writes about Putin. 
117 This is most explicitly stated by Kelsen in his essay 'Verteidigung der 
Demokratie', see: Kelsen 2006, p. 237. See also section 3.2 above. 
l!s E.g. Haffner, Sebastian, DefYing Hitler: A Memoir, London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson 2002. 
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Yertise their views in books and articles within Western democ-
racies? Or should that material, poisoning the souls of men, be 
forbidden? 
Usually democratic states are reluctant to forbid anti-
democratic ideas to circulate in written f01m. The reason is 
clear. If they would do this, they would resemble the authoritar-
ian states which they do not want to be. So no censorship. No 
list of forbidden books. That would, after all, imply that not 
only The Lenin Anthology''' could not be published, but also 
Plato's Republic120or Machiavelli's The Prince'" would end up 
on an Index of Forbidden Books. Democracy has confidence in 
the free exchange of ideas. 122 
But yet: not without limits. If there is a 'clear and present 
danger' (this is the formula usually entertained in American 
case law) that anti-democratic propaganda might be so success-
ful that actual democracies are turned into dictatorships the 
democratic state claims the right to intervene. 
That clear and present danger- criterion was developed by the 
US Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969). This was a 
case about Clarence Brandenburg, a member of the Ku-Klux-
Klan, who was prosecuted for incitement to violence and par-
ticipating in a criminal organization. In that case the US Su-
preme Court ruled that a limitation of free speech is only per-
missible under the First Amendment of the US Constitution if it 
can be proven that there was a 'clear and present danger' that 
harm would be inflicted.'" During the Cold War this 'clear and 
present danger' was also used as the formula to judge whether 
119 Lenin, The Lenin Anthology, Selected, edited and introduced by Robert C. 
Tucker, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1975. 
120 Plato, Complete Works, Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by John M. 
Cooper, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997. 
121 Machiavelli, NiccolO, The Prince, Translated and edited by Robert M. 
Adams, New York: W.W. Norton & Company 1977 (1532). 
122 As advocated by Mill in: Mill, J.S., On Liberty, Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Book 1977 (1859). 
123 See on this case: Guiora, Amos, 'Vrijheid van meningsuiting: een terugblik 
en een blik vooruit', in: Afshin Ellian, Gelijn Molier, Tom Zwart, red., Mag ik 
dit zeggen? Beschouwingen over de vrijheid van meningsuiting, Den Haag: 
BoomJuridischeUitgevers2011,p.117-139,p.164. 
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groups posed a danger to the American state because they fa-
vored communism over liberal democracy. 
Examples of a clear and present danger that democracy will 
crumble: Refah Partisi 
Let us return to the three challenges that Kagan discerned for 
democracies at present and for the time to come: Russia's au-
tocracy, China's autocracy, Islamist groups in the Middle East. 
During the cold war American case law was very much con-
cerned with communism (Russia and China, so to say). Civil 
liberties like free speech could be curtailed when there was a 
clear and present danger that communist propaganda would 
undermine the democratic state to such a degree that grave con-
sequences would be imminent if the government would hesitate 
to intervene:-At the present time China and Russia do not pre-
sent problems to Western democracies in the sense that their 
propaganda is likely to put a challenge to the democratic system 
from within. That is to say: the Trotskist, Maoist, Sartrian, Fou-
caultian and otherwise anti-western influences that were so 
popular in the nineteen-sixties of the twentieth century at the 
moment do not pose a 'clear and present danger' that democra-
cies will be toppled where they exist. 124 The threat from Russia 
and China comes from without. The problems they pose is that 
they are superpowers, having oil reserves, military equipment 
and they seem able to quell internal protest and demands for 
democracy. 
This is not the case with the third challenge that Kagan de-
lineated for Western democracies: Islamism. Islamism is a po-
tent force in countries like Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Turkey, and, 
according to some more pessimistic voices, also the West. lt is 
not our aim to give a realistic assessment of the dangers of 
Islamism, but what we can do is analyze in what sense Islamism 
contradicts the principles of liberal democracy and what this has 
to do with the second concept of liberal democracy. 
124 An interesting analysis presents: Scruton, Roger, Thinkers of the New Left, 
Longman, Burnt Mill 1985. 
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An important case in this respect is a case ruled by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg about a Turkish 
Islamist Patiy, the Refah Party, aiming to introduce sharia law 
in Turkey. 
In an epochal verdict on the Turkish Refah Party it judged 
sharia-law to be incompatible with European ideas on democ-
racy.'" The reason is simple: sharia law is the law 'from God'. 
According to the believers in this type of law it is not made by 
humans, but by God himself. Sharia law basically favors the 
idea of governance by God in the sense of theocracy. And the-
ocracy is from the nature of the concept irreconcilable with 
democracy (governance by human individuals). Even if this 
literal antithesis of democracy and theocracy can be mitigated, 
theocracy (or the rule of sharia law) still implies that clerics as 
interpreters of the supposed law of God get a position in the 
governance of the state that is hardly supportive of democratic 
ideas and institutions. So advocating sharia law - even if re-
stricted to family matters and excluding penal procedure, as is 
usually proposed to quell concern over the gradual introduction 
of religious jurisdiction in democratic states - is always some-
thing that is difficult to harmonize with democracy. Militant 
democracy in this interpretation means: we have'to protect de-
mocracy from all pretensions of religious believers, or rather 
fanatics, that there are better and more reliable sources of the 
law tl1an human arbitration. 
This case also has relevance for the Dutch situation. If there 
were a party in the Netherlands aiming to introduce Mosaic law 
or sharia law this would violate art. 81 of the Dutch constitu-
tion, which states (as we have seen) that the laws are made by 
Government and the States General.'" As Stace would explain 
125 ECHR, 'Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) v. Turkey', 13 February 2003. 
126 In this respect the Dutch 'Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij' (SGP) is a 
case in point. This fundamentalist Christian party holds three seats in parlia-
ment (as of 20 12) and this has been stable through the years (or even: decen-
nia); fluctuating between two and three seats. The party's 'Program van Be-
ginselen' ('The Core Principles') explicitly denounces quite a few fundamen-
tal (democratic) values enshrined in the Dutch constitution, like freedom of 
speech, equal rights for men and women, the abolition of the death penalty, 
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in his in-depth analysis of the foundations of democracy: that is 
not a simple observation, but expresses the essence of democ-
racy. Democracy means that the citizen in making laws for him-
self expresses his autonomy. If there were a party advocating 
the introduction of 'holy law' (again, whether this is the Mosaic 
law from the Old Testament or sharia law from the Koran is 
irrelevant) this would violate the foundations of democracy. 
Democracy is, after all, democracy (government by the people). 
5.3 The third concept: civil rights protected 
So far we have focused on the second conception of militant 
democracy. The first conception of militant democracy focused 
on defending democracy as a preferential type of government in 
general,.The second concept of militant democracy denies that 
democrats have to accept 'democratic suicide', i.e. the decision 
to abolish democracy, as a consequence of the democratic 
creed. 
This last concept of militant democracy, however, is judged 
as too limited by some. Critics of the second concept of militant 
democracy consider this 'too formal' or 'merely formalistic'. 
They want a more 'substantial' or 'material' defense of democ-
racy. 
At the bottom of this dispute about the meaning of the con-
cept of militant democracy is, of course, a dispute about democ-
racy as such. Ellian, Molier en Zwart distinguish a formal or 
procedural conception of democracy from a 'material' or 'sub-
stantial' concept of democracy .127 
This third concept of militant democracy is based on the idea 
that the notion of 'democracy' is broader than only referring to 
majority vote ('Kopfzahl-demokratie', as the Germans say). So 
and -on top of that- it advocates the introduction of Jaw solely based on the 
'Word of God'. A major difference with Refah Partisi is, of course, the SGP's 
steady but small electoral power. The 'Program van Beginselen' (including 
explanatory notes, in Dutch) is available at: 
<http:/ /www.sgp.nl/Media!download/5257 /Toe!ichting%20Pr. v .B. pdf > 
127 Ellian, Afshin, Molier, Gelijn, Zwart, Tom, 'lnleiding', in: Afshin Ellian, 
Gelijn Molier, Tom Zwart 2011, pp. 7-17, pp. 16 and 17. 
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that focus on procedures and voting, that we have analyzed 
before, although important, is not enough for a democracy. 
Democracy is based in a broader framework of ideas and insti-
tutions. Democracy is also based on respect for certain elemen-
tary constitutional rights, such as free speech, assembly, and 
press. This is the concept Loewenstein comments on when he 
writes (as cited before): 'Democracy stands for fundamental 
rights, for fair play for all opinions, for free speech, assembly, 
press. How could it address itself to curtailing these without 
destroying the very basis of its existence and justification?'. 
This goes much further than the articles from the Dutch consti-
tution that we have quoted before. Not only the clauses of the 
constitution that have to do with elections, ministerial responsi-
bility, the submissiveness of the Crown and civil servants to the 
democratically legitimated state powers should be protected, 
but also a minimum of civil liberties without which a proper 
functioning of democracy is impossible. We should be on our 
guard against parties and individuals likely to change the formal 
democratic character of the Dutch constitution, but also parties 
and individuals that sometimes bluntly announce they will abol-
ish freedom of speech, freedom of religion and freedom of as-
sembly once they are in power, as Goebbels so openly stated.'" 
This last concept of militant democracy opens a wide variety 
of questions about what constitutional rights, and how far, may 
be infringed without violating the idea of democracy as such. 
Again, we give an example of an Islamist assault on elementary 
civil liberties, this time not in Turkey but in the capital of Great 
Britain. 
The controversy over Terence MeN ally's play Corpus Christi 
The question whether propaganda for the radical Islamist con-
ception of governance should be protected under the clause of 
free speech is not only topical in the Middle East, but also in 
Western democracies. In 1999 a group of radical Muslims, the 
128 A similar stance is taken by Gelijn Molier in Molier, G, 'De vrijheid van 
meningsuiting: 'it's politics all the way down", in: Afshin Ellian, Gelijn 
Molier, Tom Zwart 2011, p. 205-242, p. 236-242. 
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Al-Muhajiroun, issued a death verdict against the American 
playwright Terence McNally, whose play Corpus Christi, 129 was 
about to be performed in London. The leader of this group, 
Sheik Omar Bakri Muhammad, fumed against McNally's play 
as being 'blasphemous'. Explaining what his stance was to-
wards democratic civil liberties, the radical leader made clear 
that his organization would not rest till the black flag of Islam 
would be officially adopted in Downing Street. 130 As Melanie 
Phillips has made clear in her book Londonistan: How Britain 
is Creating a Terror State Within (2006) 131 people like Sheik 
Bakri Muhammad really mean what they say. Their aim is noth-
ing less than a regime change. They advocate the substitution of 
the liberal democratic character of the British political order 
into a kind of sharia-state. 
This subject is, among others, treated by the American scholar 
Amos Guiora in his book Freedom from Religion: Rights and 
National Security (2009)132 and in his contribution to the vol-
ume on freedom of speech by Ellian, Molier and Zwart. 133 In 
American case law this question is treated within the context of 
a 'clear and present danger' that extremist speech can. pose to 
the continuation of the democratic state itself. There is freedom 
of speech and also freedom of religious speech, of course. But 
what if a radical preacher inveighs against democracy and 
129 McNally, Terrence, Corpus Christi, New York: Dramatists Play Service 
Inc. 1999. 
130 See on this case: Cliteur, P.B., Ellian, A, Encyclopedie van de rechtswe-
tenschap, I, De grondslagen, Deventer: Kluwer 2011, p. 63. 
131 Phillips, Melanie, Londonistan: How Britain is Creating a Terror State 
Within, London: Gibson Square 2006. See also: Phillips, Melanie, The World 
Turned Upside Down: The Global Battle over God, Truth, and Power, New 
York and London: Encounter Books 2010. 
132 Guiora, Amos N., Freedom From Religion: Rights and National Security, 
Terrorism and Global Justice Series, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009. 
133 Guiora, Amos, 'Vrijheid van meningsuiting: een terugblik en een blik 
vooruit', in: Afshin Ellian, Gelijn Molier, Tom Zwart 2011, p. 117-139. See 
also: Guiora, Amos, 'Multiculturalism and Religious Extremism: Whose 
Human Rights Do We Protect?', in: Gelijn Molier, Afshin Ellian, and David 
Suurland, eds., Terrorism, Ideology, Law, and Policy, Dordrecht: Republic of 
Letters Publishing 2011, p. 337-361. 
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seems to be so successful that the abolition of democracy and 
the introduction of some kind of theocracy seems a likely per-
spective? Can democracy condone that? 
This question is far from academic, as we know from the tur-
moil in the Middle-East and discussions about the 'Arab 
Spring'. One of the problems with the Muslim Brotherhood is 
that nowadays they do not always resort to violence."' Some 
commentators see the Muslim Brothers for that reason as reli-
able partners in a new democratic process. Others, however, 
warn us that the Muslim Brothers are still heavily opposed to 
the system of democracy as such. They like to substitute this for 
a kind of Islamist theocracy, but they only wait for the most 
suitable opportunity to realize their aims without bloodshed. 
Within the category of 'Islamism' the German Islam scholar 
and professor of international relations Bassam Tibi discerns 
two strands. 135 On the one hand there are the Islamists who are 
prepared to use violence. These are the 'jihadists'. On the other 
hand there are the Islamists he calls 'institutional Islamists', 
those who forgo violence but try to gain power by institutional 
means. We have to understand that these two groups have a 
difference of opinion about the means to be employed, not 
about the goal itself: the final abolition of liberal democracy. 
Jihadists and institutional Islamists are in complete unison 
about the final goal of their efforts. 
Most western political commentators reject this apprehension 
as being exaggerated and unduly alarmist. They tend to see 
people like Bakri Muhammad as nuisances or as crooks, but not 
as serious threats to the security, let alone survival of the British 
134 See on the Muslim Brotherhood: Ternisien, Xavier, Les Freres musulmans, 
Nouvelle Edition, Paris: Artheme Fayard 2011 (2005); Ulfkotte, Udo, Heiliger 
Krieg in Europa: Wie die Radikale Muslimbruderschapft unsere Gesellschafl 
bedroht, Vorwort von Bassam Tibi, Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn 2007; Ber-
man, Paul, The Flight of the Intellectuals, Brooklyn, New York: Me1ville 
House, 2010. 
135 In among others: Tibi, Bassam, Political Islam, World Politics and 
Europe: Democratic Peace and Euro-Islam versus Global Jihad, London and 
New York: Rout1edge, 2008; Tibi, Bassam, Euro-Islam: Die LOsung eines 
Zivilisationskonjliktes, Darmstradt: Primus Verlag, 2009. 
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state. 136 Or they think Islamists pose a threat to countries like 
Tunesia, Egypt and Turkey, but not to Western states where the 
democratic traditions are so strong that we do not have to worry 
about their collapse. 
This attitude is usually reinforced because those who do not 
pay attention to hate preachers from the Middle East are at the 
same time very concerned about populist leaders within their 
midst. Not the Islamist preachers advocating sharia law, threat-
ening Western play writers and fulminating against free speech 
and freedom of religion are the real threat to contemporary lib-
eral democracies but the populist leaders sprouting hatred to-
wards ethnic and religious minorities. It is not Abu Hamza and 
Mohammed Bakri we should focus on but Marie Le Pen, 137 Pim 
Fortuyn138 and Geert Wilders. 139 Does not incitement to hatred, 
discrimination and physical violence form the real problem at 
the moment (to quote 137d from the Dutch Penal Code)? 
The populist parties reproach the progressive-liberal elite that 
it does not identity the real threats and challenges in the con-
temporary world. 140 The liberal elite, like the elite in Weimar, 
has lost contact with reality. By not heeding the dangers that are 
so prevalent they undermine the democratic system. The 'real 
and present danger' is an intellectual elite that has lost track 
with reality. They think democracy has to be protected against 
the undermining influence of populist political leaders 141 while 
136 O'Neill, Sean, and McGrory, Daniel, The Suicide Fact01y: Abu Hamza and 
the Fins bury Park Mosque, , London, New York, Toronto and Sydney: Harper 
Perennial 2006. 
137 Fourest, Caroline, & Venner, Fiametta. Marine Le Pen, Paris: Grasset 
2011. 
138 Couwenberg, S.W., Opstand der burgers: De Fortuyn-revolte en het de-
masque van de oude politiek, Budel: Damon 2004. 
139 Fennema, Meindert, Geert Wilders: Tovenaarsleerling, Amsterdam: Uit-
geverij Bert Bakker 2010. 
140 See e.g.: Wilders, Geert, 'Defending the West from Cultural Relativism 
and Jihad\ Annual Lecture of the Magna Carta Foundation in Rome, March 
25, 2011, in: American Thinker, 26 March 2011 and Bosma, Martin, De 
schijn-elite van de valsemunters, Amsterdam: Prometheus 2011. 
141 See for an interesting overview of populist movements: Taguieft: Pierre-
Andre, L 'Illusion populiste: essai sur les dimagogies de I 'dge dimocratique, 
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oblivious or deliberately neglecting that it is those populist 
leaders who sense where the real threats come from. 
There may be an element of truth in this. It is, for instance, 
correct that the populist leaders do not advocate the abolition of 
democracy as people like Abu Hamza, Sheik Mohammed Bakri 
and others do. What they usually do is to advocate the abolition 
of all restraints in criticizing the culture and religion of religious 
minorities. Here the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV) is a case 
point. The leader of this party, Geert Wilders, was acquitted of 
all charges of insulting religious minorities and incitement to 
hatred against Muslims on June 23, 20 11.'42 Yet there is a ten-
dency to consider parties as the PVV as 'undemocratic parties' 
that undermine the proper functioning of democracy. The idea 
behind this accusation is that criticism of the religion of reli-
gious minorities (in particular Muslims) is an unjustified criti-
cism of the culture or religion of these people and therefore 
stigmatizing or insulting. 1t may not be 'racism' in the literal 
sense of the word, but 'postmodern', 'poststructuralist', 'anti-
colonialist' thinkers sense what they call 'cultural racism' .' 43 
This again has repercussions for the discussion about 'militant 
democracy'. While people like Wilders will claim to defend 
traditional parliamentary democracy against the gradual under-
mining influence of jihadist radicals, its political opponents 
claim that the PVV violates the rights of religious minorities 
(especially the right not to be discriminated against). Both par-
Paris: Flammarion, 2007. 
142 Rechtbank Amsterdam, 23 juni 201 I (vrijspraak Wilders, LJN BQ9001). 
See for some comments on the trial: Baudet, Thierry, 'Thou Shalt Not Offend 
Islam: A firsthand account of the Dutch trial ofGeert Wilders', in: The City 
Journal, 19 January 2010; Baudet, Thierry, 'De vrUspraak van Wilders in 
Europa', in: Trouw, 25 juni 2011; Esman, Abigail, 'Geert Wilders Found 'Not 
Guilty' in Victory For Free Speech', in: Forbes.com, 23 June 201 l. 
143 See on these movements: Gellner, Ernest, Postmodernism, Reason, and 
Religion, London and New York: Routledge 1992 and Sokal, Alan & 
Bricmont, Jean, Impostures Intellectuelles, Ed. Paris: Odile Jacob 1997. For 
the political ramifications: Wolin, Richard, The Wind from the East: French 
Intellectuals, the Cultural Revolution, and the Legacy of the 1960's, Princeton 
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ties claim 'militant democracy' as the concept that inspires their 
actions. 
There are no signs this discussion will abate in the foreseeable 
future. The political debate is highly polarized. Quality news-
papers, in the Netherlands, such as the NRC Handelsblad are no 
longer considered to be independent neutral providers of the 
news, but part of the culture wars, trying with all possible 
means to portray the populist leaders in the bleakest colors. 
Former editor Hans Moll wrote a book on the anti-western, anti-
Israeli and pro-Islam attitudes of NRC Handelsblad. 144 This 
apparent bias of present day journalism is nothing specifically 
Dutch, of course. Ronald Dworkin wrote about the polarized 
political debate in The United States of America 145 and Bruce 
Bawer identifies the same tendencies in British and American 
newspapers as Moll did in the Dutch media landscape. 146 There 
are not many intellectuals who, like the French journalists Caro-
line Fourest and Fiametta Venner, consistently analyze and 
criticize all antimodernist and anti-liberal assaults, whether they 
come from Islamist preachers like Tariq Ramadan 147 or from 
populist politicians like Marie Le Pen.' 48 
Amid all this controversy however there is one conviction all 
parties share, viz. that liberal democracy can only survive if we 
are on our guard against the forces that undermine it. If liberal 
144 Moll, Hans, Hoe de nuance verdween uit een kwaliteitskrant: NRC Han-
delsblad neemt stelling tegen Israel, Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Bert Bakker 
2011. The book aroused quite a stir resulting in an official commentary by the 
editor in chief of NRC Handelsblad (denying the accusations) and the publica-
tion of a book review by an independent (external) reviewer in the newspa-
per's weekly book supplement. 
145 Dworkin, Ronald, Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New 
Political Debate, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2006. 
146 Bawer, Bruce, 'The Low Countries at Their Lowest', in: FrontPage Maga-
zine, December 2, 2011. 
147 Fourest, Caroline, Frere Tariq: Discours, stratigie et methode de Tariq 
Ramadan, Paris: Bernard Grasset 2004, translated as: Brother Tariq: The 
Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan, New York and London: Encounter Books 
2008. 
148 
Fourest, Caroline, & Venner, Fiametta, Marine Le Pen, Paris: Grasset 
201 I. 
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democracy is to survive we need militant democracy. That 
means that the concept of militant democracy as developed by 
the German constitutional scholar Karl Loewenstein and the 
Dutch professor of constitutional law George van den Bergh is 
likely to stay pivotal for the years to come. Which of the three 
concepts of militant democracy we have discerned here will 
prove to be the most prominent therein, remains to be seen. 
272 
